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TRIBUTES
HEALTH, HEART AND MIND:
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF RICHARD A.
POSNER TO HEALTH LAW AND POLICY
The Honorable Diane P. Wood*
My first reaction upon being asked by the editors of THE JOURNAL OF
CONTEMPORARY HEALTH LAW AND POLICY to write a dedicatory essay
for my friend and colleague, Richard A. Posner, was "why health law in
particular"? Those who are familiar with the vast scope of Judge Posner's
writings will understand the problem immediately. This, after all, is the
person whose book on Economic Analysis of Law1 is now in its fifth
edition. Its chapters sweep through topics as diverse as the common law
of property, contracts, torts, and family relations; criminal law; the public
regulation of the competitive process found in the antitrust laws,
employment laws, and utility regulation; the laws governing financial
markets; and the legal process itself. But Judge Posner has also written
about so much more, including law and literature, jurisprudence, the role
of sex in social and legal institutions, and the failed attempt at removing
President William Clinton from office that so consumed the country
during 1998 and 1999.
Much of what Judge Posner has had to say in his more general writings
bears importantly on the issues in the field of health law and policy. Those
issues begin with vexing economic problems such as how to finance the
delivery of health care, how to support cutting edge research, and the
redistributive roles of government and private insurance. But that is just
the beginning. Ethical issues exist over the morally superior way to ration
health care resources, and rationing of some kind will always be necessary
as long as the supply is less than the demand. Thorny debates lie ahead
over subjects like the ways in which genetic knowledge can be used by
different parties (including the medical profession, private insurers, and
the government) now that the human genome project has mapped the
* Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer
in Law, The University of Chicago Law School; B.A. 1971; J.D. 1975, The
University of Texas at Austin.
1. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998).
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entire human genetic code, the way in which the human body and its
organs should be treated, and the ethics of research using embryos or
fetuses. Judge Posner has had much to say that bear on these important
questions, some of it quite provocative.
In addition to his academic writings, Judge Posner has had many
opportunities over his nearly twenty years on the federal appellate bench
to address topics bearing on health law. It is there where any judge must
draw back from intellectual speculation and work within a legal system to
come to concrete decisions about real people. Many who think of Judge
Posner as epitomizing the "law and economics" movement, and who
further think that such a devoted exponent of the dreary science must
take an antiseptic view of human behavior, would be surprised to learn
how right they might be about the first point, yet how wrong about the
second. I would like to highlight just a few of those decisions in this essay,
particularly cases that have been decided since I had the privilege of
joining him on the bench, to illustrate the degree to which Judge Posner
combines brilliance of scholarship with genuine empathy.
The first example, Murrey v. United States,2 was a medical malpractice
case that was brought by the widow of a man who died while in the care of
a Veterans Administration hospital in the Chicago area. The events
leading up to Mr. Murrey's death were appalling, as Judge Posner's
opinion for the court makes clear. He first visited the hospital in 1986,
when he was sixty-five years old and in mediocre health, with problems
including high blood pressure, obesity, chronic bronchitis, emphysema,
psoriasis, and hypoglycemia. He received treatment for these problems,
but he returned to the hospital in 1989 and was diagnosed with prostate
cancer, a fairly aggressive, fairly advanced case, according to the medical
records available to the court. The urologists at the hospital advised Mr.
Murrey to undergo the surgical removal of the entire prostate; he was
reluctant and wondered about alternative treatments, but they assured
him that surgery was better "because of Mr. Murrey's 'great' physical
condition and because the hospital did not offer radiation treatment."3 In
fact, surgery may not have been discernibly better for Mr. Murrey,
because of his age, the stage of his cancer, the comparative risks of
operation and radiation, and "the greater likelihood of unpleasant side
effects, such as impotence and incontinence. 4
In fact, surgery turned out to be a catastrophic choice for Mr. Murrey,
2. 73 F.3d 1448 (7th Cir. 1996).
3. Id.. at 1450.
4. Id.
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not because of anything about himself, but because of the way the
hospital handled his case. The operation itself took seven hours, and
afterward Mr. Murrey was placed in the intensive care unit, where he was
apparently making a satisfactory recovery. At 8:35 the next morning, he
was given morphine when he complained about abdominal discomfort.
Within five minutes, the nurses observed that his blood pressure had
dropped significantly (to 64/51); the critical care resident concluded that
he was in shock. The resident thought this might have been due to
internal bleeding, but she was not sure, and so she administered several
tests to rule out other causes. Those tests were completed by 9:57 A.M.,
and left internal hemorrhaging as the most likely explanation. For a
variety of disturbing reasons, however, Mr. Murrey was not moved to an
operating room for another hour and a half: the reasons might have
included difficulty in tracking down his treating physician (necessary
under one of the hospital's rules) or the lack of an available operating
room. By the time surgery began, at noon, Mr. Murrey had been bleeding
for hours. He died on the operating table at 3:10 P.M.
Two aspects of Judge Posner's opinion reveal the way he
conceptualized this sad tale. The first revolves around the question
whether the delay really mattered for someone with advanced prostate
cancer and a host of other health problems; the second relates to the way
medical resources were or should have been allocated here. With respect
to the first, Judge Posner wrote that even by 9:57 A.M., "Murrey's
prospects for survival were dim" only five to ten percent according to his
own expert, if the operation had begun immediately.5 But Judge Posner
said neither that this was so remote as to be worthless, nor that all life is
valuable no matter what. He said the following instead:
A loss is a loss even if it is only probable, as are most things in
life. No doubt Murrey would have paid a lot (if he had had a lot
to pay) for a 5 percent chance of survival if the alternative was a
certainty of immediate death. This shows that he lost something
by being deprived of that chance. If 200 people were in Murrey's
situation and received improper care, we would expect 10 to
have survived if all 200 had received proper care, so that if none
of the 200 was entitled to any damages the hospital would have
escaped liability for malpractice that had caused a number of
deaths in a realistic sense of 'cause.' Damages for the loss of a
chance are necessary to prevent the under- deterrence of
medical negligence.6

5. Id. at 1453.
6. Id. at 1454.
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Even a relatively small chance, then - one out of twenty - was enough to
show that Mr. Murrey had lost something valuable by the hospital's
conduct.
The other point of interest to which Judge Posner devotes some
attention in the opinion relates to the hospital's rather astonishing effort
to exculpate itself by alleging that the operating rooms were all busy, and
hence it had to leave poor Mr. Murrey in his room to bleed to death. Here
are his observations on that point:
No evidence was presented that all the operating rooms were
occupied by patients who were under a general anesthetic and
who could not have been moved without risk to an operating
room not equipped for general anesthesia, or that the hospital
had made any contingency plan to deal with a surgical
emergency (perhaps by arrangement with a nearby hospital)
when its limited number of operating rooms were full, or that it
is a sound principle of medical practice that all operations are
created equal and therefore none may be interrupted, even if
one could be interrupted, at trivial risk to the patient and the
interruption would save the life of another patient who is
bleeding to death elsewhere in the hospital. Such a principle
might be hard to square with the principle of triage, that is, of
prioritizing medical care when resources are inadequate to take
care of all patients at once.... One of the government's
witnesses opined that only a hospital that performs 'emergency'
operations, which is to say a hospital with a trauma center, need
have an operating room available at all times for emergency. We
shall not conceal our skepticism. Risky surgery performed under
nonemergency conditions, such as the operation to remove this
elderly and unhealthy man's prostate gland, can be expected in a
small but not trivial fraction of cases to produce a postoperative
crisis requiring emergency surgery. The failure to foresee and
take measures to cope with this possibility strikes us as
presumptively negligent
It is impossible to read these remarks without seeing clearly both the
incisive analytic mind and the sympathetic heart of the person writing
them. This is not to say, of course, that either Judge Posner or any other
responsible judge would allow feelings of pity to overwhelm legal
principle. Legal rules are written for all cases and for the long term.
Medical malpractice is conventionally understood as a species of
negligence law, and that law in turn is all about allocating risks and
imposing the cost of prevention on the party best able to assume it.
7. Id. at 1454-55.
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Interestingly, Judge Posner has suggested that there is also a contractual
element in the medical malpractice cases, to the extent that the doctor's
failure to exercise the customary level of care toward her patient violates
an implicit contractual term between the two. But having said that, it is
clear that Judge Posner, in applying these legal rules as objectively as he
can, is well aware of the human drama that is going on in the case.
My second example is Ralston v. McGovern,' a case brought by a
prisoner who claimed that his right under the Constitution to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment was violated when prison guards denied
necessary medical care to him. Ralston, the prisoner in question, suffered
from Hodgkin's Disease, for which he had been treated with radiation.
The radiation treatments left him with painful blisters in his throat and
pain in his mouth, for which his doctor had prescribed pain medication.
Upon returning to his cell block after one of the radiation treatments,
Ralston asked prison guard McGovern for his pain medication, but
McGovern refused to give it to him. The district court dismissed Ralston's
action based on the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, not on the
ground that McGovern's action failed to satisfy the "deliberate
indifference" standard required in these cases, but instead on the ground
that Ralston's pain did not present a serious enough medical problem to
make the refusal to alleviate it cruel and unusual.
Once again, Judge Posner's opinion reflects both the hard-headed
economist conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the situation, and the
humanist who could appreciate what this unfortunate prisoner was going
through. He begins by acknowledging that not every refusal of medical
treatment triggers constitutional protection:
Medical 'need' runs the gamut from a need for an immediate
intervention to save the patient's life to the desire for medical
treatment of trivial discomforts and cosmetic imperfections that
most people ignore. At the top of the range a deliberate refusal
to treat is an obvious violation of the Eighth Amendment,....
and at the bottom of the range a deliberate refusal to treat is
obviously not a violation.... Where to draw the line between
the end points is a question of judgment that does not lend itself
to mechanical resolution. It is a matter of determining the
civilized minimum of public concern for the health of prisoners,
which degpends on the particular circumstances of the individual
prisoner.
Here we have both a structure and an admission that mathematical

8. 167 F.3d 1160 (7th Cir. 1999).

9. Id. at 1161.
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formulae or other artificial ways of drawing lines will simply not suffice.
Instead, that elusive but all-important quality, judgment, is the only thing
that will do the metric to which Justice Potter Stewart referred in his
famous remark about obscenity: "I know it when I see it."
After that comment, the discussion in Ralston continues in the same
dualistic vein:
Beyond this it is difficult to generalize, except to observe that
the civilized minimum is a function both of objective need and
cost. The lower the cost, the less need has to be shown, but the
need must still be shown to be substantial. It seems to us that to
refuse to treat, at trivial cost, the pain caused by cancer and
cancer treatments borders on the barbarous. Realism requires
recognition that the terror which cancer inspires magnifies the
pain and discomfort of the frequent side effects of cancer
treatments.... The prison guard's deliberate refusal of
[prescribed medication] was a gratuitous cruelty, and not a
trivial one, even if the context of cancer is ignored.
So costs and benefits will be weighed in deciding the many Eighth
Amendment medical treatment cases that prisoners bring, but at the same
time Judge Posner at least will not be blind to the terror experienced by
the cancer sufferer or to the barbarity of a guard's deliberate decision to
refuse medication to a man who was literally spitting blood after his
radiation treatments.
Precision in analysis and careful attention to detail is critical not only in
the medical profession, but also in the administrative process. The next
example of Judge Posner's approach to cases implicating health care
comes from the area of social security disability benefits. It would be easy
to become jaded after many years of hearing these cases, given their
number, given the deferential standard of review that appellate courts
owe to the findings of administrative law judges, and given the real risk of
awarding benefits to malingerers. But Sarchet v. Chater11 shows that Judge
Posner has not succumbed to those temptations. This was the case of a
forty-two-year-old woman, Ms. Sarchet, who suffered from fibromyalgia
and who claimed that she was totally disabled by the disease. The
administrative law judge thought otherwise and denied her claim for
benefits, but Judge Posner, writing for a unanimous panel, reversed that
decision.
In the end, the administrative law judge's opinion did not have a
chance, after Judge Posner subjected it to his laser-like scrutiny. Here is
10. Id. at 1162.
11. 78 F.3d 305 (7th Cir. 1996).
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some, but by no means all, of the criticism:
The administrative law judge's opinion contains a substantial
number of illogical or erroneous statements that bear materially
on her conclusion that Sarchet is not totally disabled. There is
first of all a pervasive misunderstanding of the disease. The
administrative law judge criticized Sarchet for having consulted
a rheumatologist rather than an orthopedist, neurologist, or
psychiatrist. Fibromyalgia is a rheumatic disease and the
relevant specialist is a rheumatologist. The administrative law
judge also depreciated the gravity of Sarchet's fibromyalgia
because of the lack of any evidence of objectively discernible
symptoms, such as a swelling of the joints. Since swelling of the
joints is not a symptom of fibromyalgia, its absence is no more
indicative that the patient's fibromyalgia is not disabling than
the absence of headache is an indication that a patient's prostate
cancer is not advanced. 2
No one could doubt from this passage or from the rest of the opinion that
this woman's medical condition received nothing but the most careful
attention from the author of the opinion.
Since one of the questions in social security disability cases is whether
the applicant retains any residual functional capacity to work that would
enable her to perform any job in the national economy, the opinion also
looked at the administrative law judge's conclusion that Sarchet did retain
the necessary capacity. "Decisive" is hardly the word for the rejection it
gives to that conclusion:
The administrative law judge made a number of unfounded
sociological speculations which bespeak a lack of imagination
concerning the lives of many of the people who apply for social
security benefits. [The judge found Sarchet's credibility
undermined by her poor work history.] Ignored is the long list of
medical ailments from which Sarchet suffers and, so far as
appears, has long suffered, over and above fibromyalgia. She
has thickening of the vocal cords that makes her inaudible after
speaking for an hour and a half or two hours. She has
moderately severe emphysema. She is depressed, and takes
antidepressants. She is emotionally unstable. She is obese....
Despite all this, if she were a highly educated person she could
do brain work between popping pills. She is not highly educated.
Whether or not she is disabled within the necessarily restrictive
meaning of the Social Security Act and its regulations, she is

12. Id. at 307.
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unemployable and has been for a long time.13
Another quality that this passage reflects is the insistence on genuine
expertise, rather than casual assumptions about matters that are
empirically testable.
Indeed, because the ways in which medical, pharmacological, and
economic expertise factor into legal judgments is of such central
importance to the area of health law and policy, a further word on this
aspect of Judge Posner's jurisprudence is warranted. The leading modern
case on the way the federal courts treat expert witnesses is the Supreme
14
Court's 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.
Although Daubert expressed the standards that expert testimony must
satisfy in a more elaborate way, Judge Posner describes the principle of
Daubert as one that requires an expert witness who says that he is offering
an opinion based on science to use "real" science, not "junk" science.5
This is a principle he has not hesitated to apply in cases involving medical
claims. Thus, in Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 16 he considered the expert
support for a claim by the plaintiff Rosen (a smoker) that the defendant's
nicotine patch caused him to have a heart attack. Rosen relied on the
testimony of a distinguished cardiologist, Dr. Fozzard, from the
University of Chicago to support his claim, but Judge Posner found that
Dr. Fozzard had not done his job right. Both the passage in which he
rejects the Fozzard testimony and the prelude to it, in which he discusses
the nature of science, are worth a look:
To reach this conclusion [i.e. that Dr. Fozzard's testimony was
not "real science"] we do not have to become philosophers of
science and set forth the necessary and sufficient conditions of
'real' science. When the Supreme Court in Daubert told judges
to distinguish between real and courtroom science, it was not
with the object of discovering the essence of 'science', if there is
such an essence. The object, we think,.., was to make sure that
when scientists testify in court they adhere to the same
standards of intellectual rigor that are demanded in their
professional work....
Dr. Fozzard's deposition, while
expressing what may be an insightful, even an inspired, hunch
concerning the cause of the heart attack that Rosen experienced
in June of 1992, lacks scientific rigor. The deposition offers
neither a theoretical reason to believe that wearing a nicotine

13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 308.
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1236 (7th Cir. 1993).
78 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 1996).
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patch for three days, or removing it after three days, could
precipitate a heart attack, or any experimental, statistical, or
other scientific data from which such a causal relation might be
inferred or which might be used to test a hypothesis founded on
theory."
The passage goes on to discuss heart attacks, the role of smoking in heart
disease, the role of nicotine in contributing to plaque formation in
arteries, the use of animal studies as a basis for conclusions about human
health, genetic predisposition to heart disease, and the inappropriateness
of basing legal conclusions on "inspired hunches" or conjectures, even
from very distinguished experts.
Judge Posner was similarly critical of the expert's methodology in
Braun v. LorillardInc.,18 another case brought by a smoker who claimed

that the type of filter the Lorillard tobacco company put in its Kent
cigarettes was too dangerous, because it contained crocidolite asbestos.
The plaintiff, Braun, later developed mesothelioma, a form of cancer
strongly associated with exposure to that type of asbestos. After the
plaintiff's widow lost her case in the district court, she appealed. One of
the crucial issues she raised was whether the district judge properly
excluded the expert testimony of a biochemistry professor, Dr. Schwartz,
who would have testified that lung tissue obtained in the autopsy of Mr.
Braun contained crocidolite asbestos fibers. With a scathing rejection of
Dr. Schwartz's methodology, Judge Posner explained why the panel had
decided to uphold the district judge's decision and keep the evidence out:
Dr. Schwartz had never tested human or animal tissues for the
presence of asbestos fibers (or, so far as appears, for anything
else) before being hired by the plaintiff's lawyer. And he did not
bother to familiarize himself with the standard methods for
conducting such tests or to consult with scientists who are the
experts in analyzing tissue. 19

Expertise in testing building materials for the presence of asbestos, he
concluded, was too remote from human tissue testing (at least without any
showing of why one should transfer to the other) to be useful.
In the post-Daubert world, judges have taken seriously their role as
gatekeepers who must screen expert testimony and exclude the irrelevant,
the unfounded, or the unreliable. No one has encouraged them more in
this respect than Judge Posner. An excellent example comes from yet
another field of health law, the pharmaceutical industry. Twice Judge
17. Id. at 318-19.
18. 84 F.3d 230 (7th Cir. 1996).
19. Id. at 234.
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Posner has sat on panels at the court of appeals reviewing decisions in a
massive private antitrust lawsuit that was brought against most of the
major drug manufacturers, in which plaintiff retail pharmacies claimed
that the manufacturers and wholesalers had conspired to deny discounts
to them.
In PrescriptionDrugs II,"' he had occasion to consider expert testimony
that had been offered by Dr. Robert Lucas, an economist whose
credentials included the Nobel Prize for Economics. The plaintiffs wanted
Dr. Lucas to testify that the manufacturers of brand name prescription
drugs engage in price discrimination (i.e. the practice of charging different
prices to different buyers, depending on the intensity of their demand for
the drug), showing that they have market power (because price
discrimination is impossible if the buyers from whom the higher prices are
demanded can simply go out in the market and purchase a satisfactory
substitute). The district court excluded the testimony, and Judge Posner
agreed that this was correct. His reason, however, differed from that of
the district judge, who thought that Dr. Lucas had not spent enough time
studying the drug market. Posh, said Judge Posner: the link between
observed price discrimination and the existence of market power is such
an obvious one that an economist of Dr. Lucas's stature should not have
needed much time at all to see it. The problem was instead whether the
market power owed anything to collusion among the firms, or if instead it
was traceable only to the fact that each company made drugs for which
very few (if any) substitutes were available. Nobel prizes may come or
they may go: what Judge Posner wants is not just genuine expertise, but
also careful attention to the details of the case, the industry concerned,
the type of disease, or whatever the question may be on which expert
testimony is required.
Insurance is another area of central importance for health care and
policy. It will surprise no one that the economist in Judge Posner comes
out with special force in these cases. One important decision concerned
the effect, if any, of the Americans with Disabilities Act on insurance
policies that impose a cap on coverage for AIDS or AIDS-related
conditions. In Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.," the insurer
conceded that it could not show that its AIDS cap was consistent with
sound actuarial principles. It also conceded that AIDS is a disabling
condition within the meaning of the ADA. Nevertheless, Judge Posner's

20. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 186 F.3d
781, 786 (7th Cir. 1999).
21. 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
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opinion concludes that the insurance company was entitled to
discriminate against certain diseases, including AIDS, when it drafts its
policies.
In evaluating this opinion, it is important to note that he did not
understand the plaintiffs to be arguing that all medical needs of people
with AIDS were AIDS-related and thus excluded by the policies. Had
that been true, then one might infer that the insurance company was
unlawfully discriminating against people disabled by AIDS. With that
possibility out of the picture (though I will return to it), he saw the
plaintiffs as urging a position that would actually discriminate in favor of
AIDS. The plaintiffs conceded that insurance companies can and do
exclude coverage for pre-existing medical conditions, and so a company
could exclude coverage for AIDS for a person who already had the
disease when the policy went into force. This, to him, indicated that the
rule the plaintiffs wanted was an arbitrary one. Worse, he feared that such
a rule would require bookstores to stock books in Braille, or camera
stores to stock cameras specially designed for disabled people; the
economist in him saw nothing to justify such an enormous burden on the
retail sector of the economy for such a small number of people.
The plaintiffs also pointed out that people who have the HIV virus get
many of the same diseases that other people get, and at least for those
diseases, the AIDS-related disease exclusion distinguished among
sufferers only on the basis of their HIV-status. To this Judge Posner
replied as follows:
It is true that as the immune system collapses because of
infection by HIV, the patient becomes subject to opportunistic
infection not only by the distinctive AIDS-defining diseases but
also by a host of other diseases to which people not infected
with HIV are subject. Even when they are the same disease,
however, they are far more lethal when they hit a person who
does not have an immune system to fight back with. Which
means they are not really the same disease. 22
In fact, just a bit earlier in the opinion, Judge Posner recognizes that
AIDS itself, or more accurately the HIV virus, does not cause illness
directly; it just makes the individual more susceptible to other diseases.
Some of those have become associated with AIDS, such as Kaposi's
sarcoma, which are exceedingly rare (though not unknown) in the general
population, and others have not. Later, he acknowledges briefly that there
might be other conditions that also severely compromise the immune
system, and he implies that it might be acceptable for insurance
22. Id. at 561.
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companies to write exclusions for diseases "related" to those conditions as
well.
Perhaps Judge's Posner's view of the insurance arrangements in Doe v.
Mutual of Omaha is explainable in the final analysis by the network of
contracts that produced them and a general preference for private
ordering. (These contracts usually include the one between the employer
and the insurance company, the one between the insured and the
insurance company, and if the employment is not at will, the contract
between employer and employee.) Employees who do not like the scope
of coverage offered as part of their employment package can go out in the
market and buy supplemental insurance. But in the case of AIDS, that
seems to be just as unrealistic an assumption as the assumption that Ms.
Sarchet could go out in the market and find a job: AIDS coverage is
expensive, and one can predict that all insurance companies, each acting
individually in its own self interest, would adopt exclusions like Mutual of
Omaha's if they thought that federal law (especially the Americans with
Disabilities Act) would permit it. Maybe, therefore, this is another
instance in which Judge Posner thinks that the antidiscrimination laws
have gone so far as to ban efficient behavior. What may be most troubling
to him is the effort to apply a law prohibiting distinctions based on
disability to the internal content of policies that are all about such
distinctions.
There are vast areas of health law and policy on which Judge Posner
has written that deserve far more comprehensive treatment than is
possible in a brief introduction. His writings and thinking about
reproductive issues, for example, are among his best known and most
provocative. He has written about the aging process, yet another topic
with strong health law and policy dimensions. He has undertaken a study
of obesity, one of the most pervasive health problems in modern
American society. THE JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY HEALTH LAW
AND POLICY could hardly have chosen a more important legal scholar to
honor in this issue: the kind of person about whom people are thinking
when they toss off the phrase "Renaissance man," even though most
others do not deserve the accolade. Richard Posner's contributions to
health law and policy, like his contributions to so many other fields, have
helped to shape our modern understanding of the field. To have done this
much would have been a singular accomplishment; to have done it while
keeping sight of the personal, the immediate, and the human, is nothing
short of extraordinary.

